



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
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5041
CIG
16 Dec 16

From:

To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
MARINE CORPS HOTLINE COMPLAINT CASE #16847

Ref: (a) MCO 5430.1
(b) JAGINST 5800.7F, Chapter II
(c) Inspector General of the Marine Corps Investigations
Guide, August 2009

Encl: (1) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED]
Plane Captain
(2) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Quality Assurance Representative
(3) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED]
Schedules Officer
(4) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED], S-1
Officer
(5) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Schedules Officer
(6) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Airframes Officer
(7) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Plane Captain
(8) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Quality Assurance Representative
(9) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Ordnance Collateral Duty Quality Assurance
Representative
(10) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Avionics Collateral Duty Inspector
(11) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Maintenance Control Safe for Flight
(12) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED], S-4
Officer
(13) Summary of Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Wade
Workman, Commanding Officer
(14) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED]

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- Flights Officer
- (15) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Executive Officer
 - (16) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Operations Officer
 - (17) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED]
Shawn Marshall, Maintenance Chief
 - (18) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Maintenance Control Safe for Flight
 - (19) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Maintenance Control Safe for Flight
 - (20) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], Maintenance Material Control Officer
 - (21) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], 3D MAW Aviation Logistics Material
Assessment Team (ALMAT) Officer in Charge
 - (22) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED],
Aviation Maintenance Officer
 - (23) Summary of Interview of [REDACTED], VMFAT-101
 - (24) VMFA-232 Flight Schedule dtd 7 October 2016
 - (25) Copy of [REDACTED] October flight logbook entries
 - (26) Naval Aircraft Flight Record #GB70WL9
 - (27) Naval Aircraft Flight Record #GB70WLC
 - (28) Inspector General of the Marine Corps Letter dtd 4
November 2016
 - (29) Investigating Officers Appointment Letter dtd 29
November 2016
 - (30) Article 31b Rights for LtCol Workman
 - (31) Article 31b Rights for [REDACTED]
 - (32) FA-18 A-D MESM, 31 May 2016

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF THIS REPORT: Unclassified

Preliminary Statement

1. This report completes the Command Investigation (CI) of the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations submitted in Inspector General of the Marine Corps Hotline Complaint Case #16847. The complaint alleged that the Commanding Officer of VMFA-232, LtCol Wade Workman, has created a command climate that negatively impacts safe and sound flight operations. Specific allegations include:

a. That the Commanding Officer has berated pilots and maintainers in a public forum, which has created a negative command climate. That this climate has led to degraded unit performance, and a decreased adherence within the unit to

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established orders, directives, and procedures governing the maintenance and flight operation of squadron aircraft.

b. That the Commanding Officer has speculated in public, both to civilian family members and also members of the squadron, on the potential causes of a recent Class A fatal mishap prior to the release of the Aviation Mishap Board report.

c. That the Commanding Officer, and other squadron pilots, have flown aircraft that did not meet safe for flight criteria.

2. Due to the serious safety implications of such allegations, the Commanding General (CG) of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing directed a Preliminary Inquiry, which substantiated some of these issues. A follow-on Command Investigation was initiated with two Investigating Officers (IOs) assigned.

3. Physical evidence for this investigation was minimal. All reasonably available evidence was collected. Verbal interviews were taken as the primary source of information. Article 31B rights were only administered to Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Workman and [REDACTED], as no other personnel in this investigation were suspected of any wrongdoing. All personnel were compliant and agreed to waive their rights, where applicable, and chose to give statements. Verbal interviews were summarized by the IOs and then reviewed for correctness by the subjects.

4. The interviews took place over a period of a week and in two locations, MCAS Miramar and AFB Davis-Monthan, where VMFA-232 was on detachment for training. All interviewees were questioned in detail as to the relevancy and accuracy of the IG complaint allegations. Additionally, each interviewee was asked specifically what their assessment of the overall command climate was and whether it currently promoted safe and sound maintenance and flight execution. The Wing Staff Judge Advocate, [REDACTED], was consulted before and during the investigation to ensure investigation procedural compliance and that the lines of questioning were correct and relevant.

Findings of Fact

Maintenance Failures

1. VMFA-232 has failed the following three maintenance inspections: A MALS-11 pre-inspection (27-30 June 2016), a 3d MAW ALMAT inspection (19-22 September 2016), and a MALS-11

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follow up inspection (15-19 November 2016) designed to ensure fulfillment of corrections stipulated by the 3d MAW ALMAT. (Enclosures 1, 15, 17, 20, 21)

2. The squadron was also visited by the 3d MAW ALMAT while on detachment in Tucson, AZ (30 November - 8 December 2016) and was forced to discontinue flight operations. (Enclosure 21)

3. The 3d MAW ALMAT OIC stated to the investigators that VMFA-232 was the worst squadron he had inspected in his 35 squadron inspections in the Wing. (Enclosure 21)

4. The 3d MAW ALMAT OIC also asserted that he had personally spoken to the Commanding Officer on multiple occasions about the needed adjustments. (Enclosure 21)

5. The common factors identified in all four of these instances were poor maintenance program management and poor maintenance department technical training. (Enclosures 1, 15, 17, 20, 21)

6. The squadron, as a general rule, does not schedule maintenance days. (Enclosures 5, 8, 20)

7. The squadron's mandated 4 hours of maintenance technical training per month is typically scheduled between flight operations during the week and is not a priority over those flight operations. (Enclosures 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 20)

Hostile Command Climate

8. LtCol Workman has publicly confronted pilots and enlisted Marines about the status of aircraft and questioned them in detail to determine the grounds for their decisions. (Enclosures 5, 6, 8, 14)

9. LtCol Workman habitually attempts to troubleshoot issues with aircraft over the radio from the squadron ready room or from his own aircraft. (Enclosures 5, 6, 12, 14, 19)

10. LtCol Workman has a reputation amongst some enlisted and officers for berating and intimidating both pilots and maintainers. (Enclosures 5, 6, 8, 15, 20)

11. [REDACTED], the Aviation Maintenance Officer, has a reputation amongst some enlisted and officers for berating and intimidating both pilots and maintainers. (Enclosures 8, 11, 12, 19)

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12. Some Marines interviewed believe that the VMFA-232 leadership does not want to hear about their concerns. (Enclosures 2, 15, 20)

13. No evidence was discovered that indicated that LtCol Workman, or any other pilot in the squadron, has knowingly taken an aircraft that did not meet safe for flight criteria. (Enclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 16, 20)

Unreliable Airspeed Incident

14. During a flight which he was the actual Division Leader, LtCol Workman's aircraft experienced an unreliable airspeed indication (FC AIR DAT FAIL). (Enclosures 5, 6, 12, 13)

15. The flight was briefed to recover at Miramar with a formation break. (Enclosures 5)

16. Due to other aircraft maintenance issues, the flight lead decided to execute a straight-in approach. (Enclosure 5)

17. As the flight arced to achieve line-up for the straight-in, the airspeed decreased to 200 KCAS before LtCol Workman asked for the speed check over the radio. (Enclosures 5)

18. LtCol Workman did not inform the rest of flight of the issue until close to landing. (Enclosures 5, 12)

19. LtCol Workman's wingman was very concerned and uncomfortable, and disagrees with what he perceived as LtCol Workman's casual reaction to the situation. (Enclosure 5)

20. The incident was not debriefed post-flight. (Enclosures 5, 12, 13)

21. LtCol Workman contends there was never a significant issue at hand and felt no need to communicate the issue over the radio to the rest of his flight. (Enclosure 13)

Exceeding Crewday Violation

22. On 7 October 2016, during Red Flag Alaska, LtCol Workman signed a flight schedule that was in violation of Wing Order 3710.39F (3d Marine Aircraft Wing Flight SOP) and the Standard Operating Procedures for USMC F/A-18 Flight Operations that

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specifies crewday for aircrew shall not exceed 12 hours.
(Enclosures 24)

23. [REDACTED] was scheduled for a 12.9 hour crewday.
(Enclosures 24)

24. [REDACTED] ultimately executed a 13.8 hour crew day after experiencing a significant maintenance delay on launch of his second event and recovered 20 minutes after published sunset.
(Enclosures 25, 26, 27)

25. [REDACTED] was the Section Leader for this event.
(Enclosures 22, 24)

26. [REDACTED] arrived at 0530-0545 and attended the "Mass" brief as per the flight schedule. (Enclosure 4, 24)

27. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] came in around 0700, and that [REDACTED] did not attend the "Mass" Red Flag brief.
(Enclosures 22)

28. [REDACTED] was aware that the land time would be close, but briefed [REDACTED] that they would "Make the land time."
(Enclosure 22).

29. [REDACTED] takes responsibility for the late land time as the section leader. (Enclosure 22)

30. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were re-directed along routing due to traffic causing them to land late. (Enclosure 22)

31. [REDACTED] originally believed that he was only to fly the "first-go" in the morning and not the second in the afternoon.
(Enclosure 4)

32. [REDACTED], Operations Officer (OPSO), confirms [REDACTED] belief that he was only to fly the "first-go" in the morning and not the second in the afternoon. (Enclosure 16)

33. After a discussion with the Commanding Officer in the ready room at noon, [REDACTED] thought that he had been granted an extension to the crewday. (Enclosures 4)

34. [REDACTED] believed the CO knew he had flown the first event and made a conscience decision to extend his crew day.
(Enclosure 4)

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35. [REDACTED] did not inform the CO of the schedule change.
(Enclosure 16)

36. There was no change to the ODO schedule due to the
logistics of the exercise. (Enclosure 16)

37. [REDACTED] believes the CO didn't know that [REDACTED]
wasn't supposed to fly the evening event. (Enclosure 16)

38. LtCol Workman contends he was under the idea that [REDACTED]
did not fly the morning event. (Enclosure 13)

Unauthorized discussion of Aviation Mishap Information

39. LtCol Workman has speculated both in the ready room and to
[REDACTED] about the cause of [REDACTED]
Class A mishap before the completion and release of the ongoing
investigations. (Enclosures 5, 6, 12, 13, 15)

Form Light discussion

40. In November 2016, there was a disagreement as to the status
of a jet with form light issues. (Enclosures 10, 11, 19)

41. [REDACTED] (Maintenance Control) believed the aircraft to
be down for the flight in accordance with the MESM (Code L).
(Enclosures 19, 32)

42. [REDACTED] relayed to the pilot over the radio that the
jet was down for the event. (Enclosure 19)

43. [REDACTED] felt there was a lack of trust when his
decision was questioned by [REDACTED] (PTO) who was
communicating with the AMO and the CO via phone. (Enclosure 19)

44. [REDACTED] now understands the MESM, and that his
interpretation was incorrect. (Enclosure 19)

Opinions

1. LtCol Workman has engaged pilots and maintainers on several
occasions in a confrontational way. This has led to reluctance
on the part of squadron personnel to engage with him about
aircraft maintenance or flight issues. This may not meet the
strict definition of berating behavior, but it clearly has
negatively affected the squadron's culture of trust. (FF 8, 10)

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2. The current AMO, [REDACTED], has berated and intimidated both pilots and maintainers in the unit. This has created a toxic climate within both the squadron maintenance department and ready room and is affecting safe flight operations. (FF 11)
3. LtCol Workman has speculated both in the ready room and to [REDACTED] about the cause of [REDACTED] Class A mishap before the completion and release of the ongoing investigations. (FF 39)
4. No squadron pilot has knowingly taken off in an aircraft that did not meet safe for flight criteria. (FF 13)
5. LtCol Workman displayed poor CRM on a division recovery to MCAS Miramar by not communicating his unreliable airspeed indications to his division until near the end of the flight. It is clear that his junior pilot wingman did not see the incident in the same light and became very apprehensive when LtCol Workman's approach speed significantly decelerated without an accompanying call over the radio to explain. (FFs 17, 19)
7. By failing to debrief the unreliable airspeed incident immediately afterward in the ready room, LtCol Workman reinforced a negative perception among his pilots that he was casual with adherence to rigorous flight standards. (FF 18)
8. The multiple inspection failures were a consequence of LtCol Workman's unwillingness to listen to his maintenance department leadership and to comply with suggested adjustments (i.e. scheduled maintenance days, properly executed technical training) from MALS / Wing maintenance inspectors. (FFs 4, 5, 6, 7)
9. LtCol Workman either knowingly violated the Wing Flight OPS SOP, and pressured a young pilot to fly past the 12 hour crewday restriction, or was completely unaware of the execution status of the squadron's flight schedule and who was flying. (FF 34, 37, 38)
10. [REDACTED] believed he had been granted an extension by the Commanding Officer prior to his second event on 7 October 2016. While this does not excuse [REDACTED] of his responsibilities as an aircraft commander for executing a 13.8 hour crewday, it is also clear he was under the impression his second event of the day had been cancelled until he spoke to the CO in the ready room. (FFs 31, 33, 34)

11. The Commanding Officer has set a command climate that does not promote full adherence to proper maintenance and flight procedures, and has fostered a confrontational atmosphere that discourages Marines of all ranks to voice their opinion about critical issues. The trust between the Commanding Officer and the unit is in an irreparable state. (FFs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 33, 34)

1. The findings of fact clearly delineate a squadron command climate that is compromised. We recommend to the Commanding General the following:

- ### Point of Contact

1. The points of contact in this matter are

Encl. 1

[REDACTED]:

-Currently Quality Assurance (has been the Controlled Technical Publications Clerk for last 3 months), Power Line (year prior)

1. Does not know instances where the CO, any other officer, berated someone of any rank.
2. Feels that morale is pretty neutral, says the planes are down for "paperwork" but that the Marines are doing "good" maintenance. Heard the squadron was shut down by the Wing ALD inspectors due to bad programs.
3. Does not feel that the squadron is bound to have another mishap.
4. Does not know of any instance the squadron CO taking a down jet. Or any other pilots.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Encl. 2

[REDACTED]

-Currently works in QA (1 month), prior to that he was in AVI (10 months)

1. Does not know instances where the CO, any other officer, berated someone of any rank.
2. Feels the squadron is not in a good place. Has brought up issues proper CDI work but does not feel that his opinion will get far. Feels squadron leadership is disconnected from what the E-5 and below are doing.
3. Does not know of any instance the squadron CO taking a down jet or of anyone else doing so.

ENCLOSURE (2)

Encl. 3

[REDACTED]

-Currently Skeds O, been in the squadron 10 days

1. Likes the squadron, doesn't really know the CO. Has heard a smattering of good and bad.
2. Has not seen berate - like treatment of any kind and has not heard of it.
3. Has not seen the CO speak of [REDACTED] mishap except in passing.
4. Says [REDACTED] told him he will get the "rest" of the story in the future once things calm down and he is fully checked in.
5. Does not know of any instance the squadron CO taking a down jet.

ENCLOSURE (3)

Encl. 4

[REDACTED]

-Adj / S-1, (been in the squadron 2 months, prior Prowler pilot in VMAQ-2 where he was the Powerline OIC)

1. Has never felt that the jets are unsafe and has never been pressured to take a down jet. Has not been questioned on his maintenance calls. Has not heard of it happening.
2. Has not seen "berate - like" treatment of any kind and has not heard of it.
3. Hasn't seen the CO talk about the mishaps. Not to the families either.
4. Has not heard of the CO, or anyone else, taking a down jet.
5. Did break crew day at Red Flag Alaska. 13.8 hours and landed 20 minutes after sunset on the night of Oct 7th. Schedule had over a 12 hour daytime crewday (two flights, a morning flight and then an afternoon flight that had [REDACTED] [REDACTED] scheduled to land 5 minutes before sunset). Wing SOP states only a 12 hour crewday can be authorized by a squadron commander. [REDACTED] caught the error on the sked, asked Ops what they wanted him to do. He contends they told him to do the first event and not the second. He came in at 0530 for a 0600 Red Flag brief, conducted his flight and was in the Ready Room afterward when he ran into the CO. The CO asked him if he "was good to fly" the second event. It is unclear if there was additional implicit tone of voice but [REDACTED] took this as permission to fly the second event and that he had an extension. [REDACTED] in fact launched late due to maintenance and landed after sunset. See supporting NAVFLIR, Log book copy and Oct 7, 2016 flight schedule.

Additional Interview by [REDACTED] on 19 Dec 2016:

1. In reference to the crew day violation: Arrived at 0530-0545 for the "Mass" brief.
2. Thought the CO had known that he had flown the morning event.
3. Thought that by the CO's line of questioning (i.e. "How do you feel?", "You good to go fly the evening event?"), that the CO was making a deliberate decision to have him go fly.
4. Did not feel coerced to go fly.

ENCLOSURE (4)

Encl. 5

██████████:

-Sked O / ██████████, (in the squadron for a year)

1. Doesn't feel it's a positive environment. Specially doesn't agree with how the CO interacts with maintainers and junior pilots.
2. Has seen the CO berate people.
 - a. Specially, ██████████ incident where the CO confronted him for rolling to the spare jet. Contends ██████████ was visibility upset by the episode.
 - b. Has been "screamed" at by the CO. Was told "my way or the highway" and CO threw paperwork on the ground. CO apologized later.
 - c. Has had incidents where the CO has jumped on the radio for troubleshooting both on the ground and the air.
 - d. Has witnessed the CO berate Marines in MC.
3. Verifies the CO's low airspeed incident in detail. Was the wingman for the CO. In his opinion the CO not use good headwork on FC AIR DAT FAIL. Was very concerned and states the CO did not debrief the incident after the flight.
4. Has felt the squadron has steadily improved in RBA. Feels the squadron maintainers are inexperienced but that no investment is being made to improve them (i.e. little to no maintenance days or dedicated time for tech training)
5. Feels there is a lot of perceived pressure to get flights out.
6. Asserts the CO hinted heavily for ██████████ to change his arrival at work to facilitate the correct crewday on flight in Alaska during Red Flag.
7. Verifies (was the ██████████) that the CO did speculate on the cause of the mishap to the family prior the completion of the AMB to ██████████ at Balboa and also that the CO speculated in the ready room.

Additional Interview by ██████████ on 19 Dec 2016:

1. The flight was briefed to return with a break to homefield.
2. During the return flight a couple of the jets had mechanical issues (one with gear) so the CO opted to do straight-ins. Flight was coming from feet wet.
3. Flight started to arc around for final and got down to 200 KCAS.
4. As wing, it was very uncomfortable and out of the ordinary.

ENCLOSURE (5)

5. CO called for a speed check and then immediately configured the flaps.
6. Found out about the FC AIR DAT FAIL from maintenance control. Never debriefed.

ENCLOSURE (5)

Encl. 6

[REDACTED]

-Airframes OIC, prior to the NATOPS / Ground Safety (13 months)

1. Verifies the CO did come out to the flight line and confronted him in front of maintainers right at the ladder of the spare. CO did not climb on the jet when he rolled to the spare. [REDACTED] (at that time AMO, and also verifies this encounter in his own interview) was with the CO when he confronted him.
 - a. CO did tell him take a plane that had a GLIM 7.5. Plane didn't know its own weight.
 - b. Does confirm he felt pressured to take an aircraft that was in an unknown status.
 - c. CO was trouble shooting extensively over the radios.
 - d. Didn't have any issues on the flight. Didn't seriously feel he should cancel for human factors but did consider it.
2. Feels you have to be very assertive with the CO when dealing with aircraft issues and that you will be questioned heavily.
3. Asserts that [REDACTED] father relayed to him that the CO had speculated on the cause of the mishap prior to the completion of the AMB over a phone call.
4. Can't verify the ready room speculation on the Class As
5. Verifies the low airspeed incident with the CO. Was ODO that night and remembers [REDACTED] talking about it immediately afterwards.

ENCLOSURE (6)

Encl. 7



-Plane Captain, CDI (2 ½ years)

1. (Climate) Thinks things are going well, at least from the Power Line division. Feels like the squadron is catching up and putting together programs that have been neglected. Specifically completing paperwork correctly.
2. Has not seen the CO, or any other pilot, berate anyone and has not heard of any stories.
3. Feels heavy operational pressure.
4. No instances he knows of flying down jets. CO or otherwise.
5. Feels that is a junior maintenance department but getting better.

ENCLOSURE (7)

Encl. 8

[REDACTED]

-Plane Captain, Full Systems CDQAR, (QA since 2013)

1. Previous CO made time for maintenance days and tech training. Under current command there is no focus on the inspections. Told to make time for program management on "your own time".
2. Verifies no sustained and systematic tech training is occurring at this time.
3. Doesn't feel things specifically unsafe. But feels they are not making investments in the long term proficiency and training of the maintainers.
4. Verifies CO yelled at a Plane Captain, [REDACTED]. "Fix it!"
5. Verifies CO confronted the QA Chief, [REDACTED] over his disagreement of an aircraft being down for flight. Also verifies the CO did apologize in front of the entire QA shop.
6. Verifies the CO did confront [REDACTED] at the ladder of a spare aircraft and that he told the him to get back in the original jet.
7. Can't confirm the OBOGSS or the Lights or the low airspeed incidents.
8. [REDACTED] heavily pressured him to fix a fuel line in a way that is not an O level task.

ENCLOSURE (8)

Encl. 9

[REDACTED]

-Ordnance, QASO, CDQAR (in squadron since 2013)

1. Feels the squadron was in a rough spot but getting better. Doesn't feel all the heat on the squadron is totally justified. Feels that ALMAT team is working overtime to find things.
2. Feels the flight schedule is not well thought out and seems very reactive. Very poor future planning that has impacted maintenance execution. Feels Maintenance is not included in any planning of squadron operations or logistics.
3. Flight schedule always has changes that impact execution of the next day.
4. Can't verify berating behavior by the CO of any type.
5. Verifies the MESM lights issue and says [REDACTED], (Avionics) has more information.

ENCLOSURE (9)

Encl. 10

[REDACTED]

-AVI, CDI (about 3 years)

1. Verifies the form light issue, can't verify if it actually flew. Thinks it did fly. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in MC that night to his recollection and should be able to give more details.

ENCLOSURE (10)

Encl. 11

[REDACTED]

-MC, AVI (1 year in the squadron)

1. Feels the maintenance pause in justified and is having good effects. Catching up on "paperwork".
2. Tempo is very high. Feels that they aren't getting the time to keep up with maintenance.
3. Lots of turnover.
4. Has never seen or heard of the CO berating an officer, or enlisted. Does say the AMO, [REDACTED] does however.
5. Has heard about the night light flight incident.
Recommends [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were on duty at the time in MC to verify.

ENCLOSURE (11)

Encl. 12

[REDACTED]

-Was Airframes OIC until 3 weeks ago, now S-4 (2 years in the squadron)

1. Feels the jets are safe and they always have been. Has no doubt about the quality of the maintenance but does acknowledge that the squadron is undermanned and under qualified post deployment. Vicious cycle of no jets, and trying to fly. Squadron overtasked.
2. Doesn't feel they are producing the needed flight hours to sustain pilot proficiency.
3. Doesn't feel the command climate environment is changing since their last mishap.
4. Feels [REDACTED] hurts the squadron culture.
5. Confirms the FC AIR DAT FAIL incident with the CO. Was the Division Leader under instruction, CO was actual Div Lead. Confirms the CO did not tell the rest of his division about the issue during the flight. Only remembers an "airspeed issue" being mention immediately prior to landing. Confirms incident not debriefed post flight.
6. Confirms that the CO is very involved in trouble shooting over the radio.
7. Confirms the CO did give his opinion to the cause of the [REDACTED] mishap prior to the release of the AMB. Did have a ready room discussion as well.

ENCLOSURE (12)

Encl. 13

LtCol Wade Workman

- CO since Jan 16

1. Command Culture workshop planned for January 16. Did the 3 year Command Safety Assessment May 16. Says that it went fine. Does not remember anything unusual in the results.
2. Felt the squadron had a big "malaise" upon taking over. Felt the squadron had been conditioned to mediocre flight production. "Not how I remember single seat Hornet squadrons operating at Miramar."
3. Not working weekends. Doesn't feel overworking the Marines.
4. Doesn't feel command pressure from the MAG
5. Contends he is really trying to get the proper flight time for the young guys. Worried about young pilot proficiency. (11 hours a month hard deck)
6. Asserts he had a really poor prior OPSO in the spring, almost fired [REDACTED] who was OPSO until July. Poor planning that impacted maintenance. New OPSO doing better. Changed out AMOs in Sept.
7. Admits he made mistakes (QA incident with [REDACTED] where he confronted her, by his own admission, in a way that was not conducive to good maintenance culture. Went down and apologized for it later in front of entire QA shop.)
8. Supports tech training, was briefed on the plan. Contends he didn't know it was wasn't happening and wasn't briefed that there was an issue. Says he was caught off guard by the poor level of tech training uncovered by the MALS / ALD inspectors.
9. In regards to [REDACTED] mishap, he admits he spoke to [REDACTED] and Ready Room about potential possibilities that caused the mishap but argues he stressed the AMB will have the final answer.
10. Acknowledges flight with the FC AIR DAT FAIL and acknowledges he didn't tell the flight until close to landing but doesn't remember it the same way as [REDACTED]. Does not remember it was ever an issue and that they got excessively slow. Acknowledges they did not debrief it.

ENCLOSURE (13)

Encl. 14

[REDACTED]

-Flight O (since August '16), PL OIC for eight months prior

1. Feels the squadron has steadily declined since January (CO's arrival month). Feels it was a really good squadron on the last deployment and the morale has decreased. "Devils used be the place to be, now if you are here you want to be somewhere else."
2. Really high Ops tempo. Not manned or experience level to sustain in in his opinion.
3. Feels that the capability did not match expectations.
4. Confirms the CO questions folks heavily on trouble shooting. "If I down this jet what is the Skipper going to say to me. I feel like we force it." Confirms CO trouble shoots over the radio.
5. Confirms [REDACTED] was upset after his episode with the CO and their confrontation on the flight line when [REDACTED] rolled to the spare.
6. Good friends with [REDACTED]. Asserts that [REDACTED] did not feel fully prepared or confident about going to WTI.

ENCLOSURE (14)

[REDACTED]

-Currently the XO, AMO until relieved by the CO from that billet (until Sept 16, 9 months as AMO)

1. Feels morale in maintenance is really low. "It's been drive, drive, drive." Not enough time for tech training and catching up on scheduled maintenance. Verifies the unit failed its MALS-11 pre-inspection, the 3D MAW ALMAT inspection, and the MALS-11 re-inspection.
2. Never recalls missing a flight hour goal when he was the OPSO under the prior command. One maintenance day a week. Now none or only when extremely needed. Would be bring up over scheduling to CO but feels not listened to. "12 sorties a day and keep putting it on the schedule."
3. Says the CO doesn't like to simulate ordnance. Feels this induces maintenance.
4. Significant difference in philosophy from prior CO.
5. Has seen the CO berate someone, the [REDACTED] incident, which he witnessed. Characterizes the CO as very angry and upset. Had multiple Marines come to him afterwards and state [REDACTED] was visibly upset. "[REDACTED] hand was shaking when he signed for the book."
6. Confirms the ready room discussion about the [REDACTED] mishap pilot error. Also the [REDACTED] discussion.
7. CO says, "A lot of this isn't how it was when I was AMO." Feels the CO is not adjusting to the new Hornet reality.
8. Says the negative impact was immediate after the change of command. Contends he and others made multiple negative comments on the initial Command Climate Survey.

[REDACTED]

-OPSO since July (PSC'ed from the UK Typhoon II exchange)

1. Feels that the squadron is good, in a rough patch, but on its way up.
2. Feels the squadron got into an OIR rut (same flows every day, very predictable). Squadron lost a lot of quals and experience post deployment.
3. Doesn't feel the squadron over tasked. Feels jets are safe.
4. Does not have any personal knowledge of the CO or anyone else taking down jets or pressuring someone to do so.
5. Was OPSO at time of [REDACTED] violation of crew day but was not aware that it had happened. Thought that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] afternoon event had been cancelled. (see [REDACTED] interview for full explanation)

Additional Interview by [REDACTED] on 19 Dec 2016:

1. Crew Day Violation: There was no ODO schedule change and [REDACTED] stated there was no communication between him and the CO about the cancelled event.
2. Was not present for the CO and [REDACTED] interaction in the Ready Room.
3. Believes that the CO didn't know that [REDACTED] wasn't supposed to fly the event.
4. Stated that there was no "Red-Inked" ODO sked due to the logistics of the exercise.

- [REDACTED]
- Maint. Chief since, June 22nd arrival (came from AMO School in Milton as an instructor)
 - 1. Checked in the summer and immediately identified the need for tech training and NAMP program management. "If you don't put the same emphasis on maintenance training as pilot training you get these problems."
 - 2. Verifies the failed inspections were for program mismanagement and poor technical training.
 - 3. Heavy Op tempo. Squadron is operating outside the ability of its personnel for what it wants to do. Squadron is undermanned specifically in terms of SNCOs. 11 individual SNCOs under.
 - 4. "This shutdown was a blessing in disguise. Without it we would have for sure failed CNAF."
[REDACTED] (MMCO) says the exact same thing.
 - 5. CO comes off as very frustrated but not abusive with MC.
 - 6. Doesn't know of any instances of the pilots or the CO knowingly taking down aircraft.

Encl. 18

[REDACTED]

-MC SFF, (5 months), PL QA in an East Coast squadron prior

1. Pace is high, but felt his east coast squadron was busier.
2. Focus on program prep is not sufficient for inspections.
3. No pilots knowingly taking out down aircraft
4. Feels like the expectation is high. Lots of questions about status of aircraft.
5. Does not feel berating is happening. Pilots are however sometimes frustrated with the pace of maintenance production.

ENCLOSURE (18)

Encl. 19

[REDACTED]

-SFF in MC about 9 months. In QA prior (prior squadron was VMFAT-101)

1. Feels the tempo is fast but is used to it but came from VMFAT-101.
2. Feels the op pause is overdue and programs are finally getting squared away.
3. Feels current CO is significantly different from the prior CO. Feels the environment is very draining. Felt he had to take leave to recover. Very fast pace since change of command.
4. Does verify the MESM form light incident. Cannot remember the pilot however. Only time it happened. Feels like he was not listened to and that he was overridden by squadron CO and AMO ([REDACTED]). Personally, called out to the jet on the maintenance radio to ask the pilot if he understood that in his opinion ([REDACTED]) that the jet was down for night flight by how he interpreted the MESM.

Additional Interview by [REDACTED] on 19 Dec 2016:

1. Was fairly new in MC (less than a year)
2. Was learning the MESMs
3. Thought that he had it right, but since has learned what some of the pilot terms mean.
4. Now understands that his interpretation of the code "L" was incorrect.
5. Had the Squadron PTO in MC that night communicating with the CO and the AMO via phone.
6. Felt de-valued by the line of questioning, but now understands that he was wrong.

ENCLOSURE (19)

[REDACTED]

-Maintenance Material Control Officer (MMCO) for over a year.

1. Feels the climate is not good.
2. The pace of the squadron is creating an environment where corners are being cut. It always feels like "the sky is falling", and despite the manpower, the quals, and the supply problems, we continue to just fly.
3. Squadron does not take maintenance days.
4. Ops schedules twelve sorties per day and flies most every weekend on the road. ..."he would fly the barn every day if he could".
5. Leadership accepts poor paperwork processes (programs) to fly.
6. Has seen the CO engage with pilots and maintainers negatively and question QA and Plane Captains in front of others.
7. Knows of Pilots (Specifically mentioned the AMO) to take off after sunset for the "Pro" (Profile/FCF).
8. Believes that VMFA-232 leadership doesn't care about maintenance or inspections. Even after the inspection failures, no time was afforded to work on programs or fix discrepancies.
9. Doesn't believe that any Pilot knowingly took a jet at any time that was not Safe-For-Flight.
10. Believes that the climate immediately declined when [REDACTED] took Command.

[REDACTED]

-OIC of the 3D MAW ALMAT Inspection team

1. On deck in Tucson with his team for several days at the direction of the CG of 3D MAW at time of this interview. At his prompting to the Asst. Chief of Staff for ALD, VMFA-232 was shut down from further flight operations until the inspection team could conduct remedial technical training and program management instruction.
2. Categorizes the squadron maintenance programs as, "The worst I have seen in the 35 squadrons I have inspected."
3. Asserts he has personally debriefed LtCol Workman on multiple occasions about the poor state of maintenance training and maintenance program management in his unit.
4. Asserts he told LtCol Workman personally that the squadron needed to take an "Op Pause" from flying to concentrate on getting maintenance programs in order and satisfy tech training proficiency.

[REDACTED]

-Aviation Maintenance Officer

1. States the climate is challenging from the CO down to the Junior Officer.
2. It is hard to come from a combat tour back to having to achieve all skill sets again.
3. Does know of the CO getting into an argument with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CO regrets and apologized. Believed to be an isolated incident.
4. Doesn't believe that he (himself) berates people. Says he plays the "Bad Cop" really well and holds people accountable on the spot.
5. Says he is harsh and firm but doesn't think he is doing anything out of line.
6. Does have first-hand knowledge that the CO spoke to /speculated about the mishap to [REDACTED].
7. Believes that the CO followed his heart instead of his head in a difficult situation.
8. Advised the CO to stick with the "Party Line" concerning the mishap and speaking to anyone.
9. Believes that the Maintenance department is getting healthier.
10. Thinks the shut down in Tucson was a good thing.
11. Challenging times with lack of SNCOs and qualifications.
12. Would choose to fix and fly over paperwork and were not "Dotting I's or Crossing T's".
13. Does know of an augment pilot taking a jet that should have been down and it was caught immediately and handled. Believed to be an isolated incident.
14. Was the section leader for [REDACTED] event in Alaska when he broke crew day.
15. Believed [REDACTED] came in at 0700 because he ([REDACTED] [REDACTED] wasn't needed for the "Mass" brief that morning.
16. Stated he asked [REDACTED] if he was good on crew day and that they would mitigate by making a land time to be within his crew day.
17. They landed late due to being re-routed for traffic.
18. Stated he is responsible as the section leader for that event.
19. Did not have first-hand knowledge of the form light incident, but states the MESM is confusing and often maintainers are confused by the verbiage. Believes this

to be the case and when questioned, the maintainers felt slighted.

20. Believed that it has been challenging for the Marines to see leadership engaged and questioning their decisions.
21. His personal take is that the current CO is extremely different than the previous. He is Tactical/Operationally-Minded. He is rough around the edges and takes care of people differently. He will make sure the Marines come home because you are trained and ready.
22. States it is hard to develop a ready room when the old one has never left.


[REDACTED]

-Currently at VMFAT-101, Spent August, September, and October with VMFA-232.

1. Thinks the culture is healthy. Socially, everyone seems to get along. Professionally feels there is a sense of ambiguity and curiosity as to why the jets are breaking and the mishaps have happened.
2. Believes the climate is healthy and functional
3. OPSO was brand new and the AMO and XO had been there for a while.
4. Has never seen the CO berate any officer or enlisted.
5. Has never seen the XO berate any officer or enlisted.
6. Is curious if people in the squadron are just not willing to accept the challenge or accept the CO's expectations.
7. Does not know of anyone taking a jet that is not SFF.
8. Does not know of anyone going against the MESM.
9. Admits he was only there for a short and only conducted about 20 flights with the squadron, but never witnessed anything out of the ordinary.
10. Felt there was adequate communication between ops and maintenance.
11. Stated he thought the CO was pretty level-headed and showed restraint on occasions.
12. Feels that all maintenance departments are lacking manpower, qualifications, parts, and time.
13. Did not see any issues in the maintenance department during his time at 232 that were out of the ordinary.



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 232
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 11
3RD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, MARFORPAC
PO BOX 452055
SAN DIEGO, CA 92145



FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR:

Friday 7-October-2016

Julian Date: 6251
Sunrise: 08:21
Sunset: 18:55
Moonrise: 15:53
Moonset: 21:58
EENT: 20:41
% LL: 33.0%
Airfield Hours: 0730-2400

SDO:
DNCO:
ADNCO:

VUL 1 ODO:
VUL 2 ODO:
VUL 3 ODO:
PRO PILOT:

TYPE ACFT: F/A-18C
AS OF LPQD: 5 OCT 2016
DAILY SORTIES/HOURS SCHED: 18 / 27.0
PROJECTED FLOWN
MONTHLY SORTIES/HRS: 152 / 241.8 9 / 39.8
QUARTERLY SORTIES/HRS: 524 / 725.4 9 / 39.8
FY SORTIES/HRS: 2264 / 3200.6 9 / 39.8

THIS FLIGHT SCHEDULE CONSTITUTES OFFICIAL ORDERS: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EVT	C/S	BRIEF	ETD	ETA	DEP	ARR	PILOT	TR CODES	EPC	FLIGHT PLAN	AREAS/TOS	FUEL	TAC	ORD	FILE	NOTES
1-1	HELMET 41	06:00	09:55	10:25	PAEI	PAEI		2102	1A1	SP520	ALL RANGES	T		ABCDE ABCDE	MED	
1-2	HELMET 42															
1-3	FABLE 51	06:00	09:05	10:35	PAEI	PAEI		2102	1A1	SP520	ALL RANGES	T		ABCDE ABCDE ABCDE ABCDE	MED	
1-4	FABLE 52															
1-5	FABLE 53															
1-6	FABLE 54															
2-1	EVEN 51	10:30	13:22	14:52	PAEI	PAEI		2102, 6111	1A1	SP520	ALL RANGES	T		ABCDE ABCDE	MED	1
2-2	EVEN 52															
2-3	WITTY 61	10:30	13:32	15:02	PAEI	PAEI		2102, 6111	1A1	SP520	ALL RANGES	T		ABCDE ABCDE ABCDE ABCDE	MED	1
2-4	WITTY 62															
2-5	WITTY 63															
2-6	WITTY 64															
3-1	FABLE 01	14:30	17:20	18:50	PAEI	PAEI		2102	1A1	SP520	ALL RANGES	T		ABCDE ABCDE	MED	2
3-2	FABLE 02															
3-3	HELMET 11	14:30	17:25	18:55	PAEI	PAEI		2102	1A1	SP520	ALL RANGES	T		ABCDE ABCDE ABCDE ABCDE	MED	
3-4	HELMET 12															
3-5	HELMET 13															
3-6	HELMET 14															

* SECTION LEAD ** DIVISION LEAD @ EVALUATED + MISSION COMMANDER

FLIGHT NOTES

1. AAR PROVIDED BY TRITON 61.
2. EVENT 3-2 DESIGNATED SPARE.

ODO NOTES

1. PILOTS LOG FLIGHTS IN MSHARP.

VEHICLE TRANSPORT PLAN

- V1. 0500 - MAJ FRANZEN MEKOLIK AND YOUNGERS.
- V2. 0500 - CAPT KIRCHNER, FRAZER, WALPOLE, AND CODY.
- V3. 0830 - MAJ MACHNIAK, BEHRMANN, CAPT CAMPBELL, BISSELL, AND DORSETT. (RETURN TWO VEHICLES)
- V1. 1330 - LTCOL WORKMAN, MAJ THOMPSON, AND BUTLER.
- V2. 1330 - CAPT RHEINHART AND CODY.

NOTES

- 0500: MONDAY AM ATO BREAKOUT LIFE VUL IN THE MPC FOR S-2.
0800: MONDAY AM INITIAL COORD LIFE IN THE MPC FOR MAJ MEKOLIK.
0815: FOD WALK.
0830: DF / CC STANDUP FOR LTCOL WORKMAN, AND A MAINT REP IN THE CCR.
1030: MONDAY AM INITIAL SLIDE REVIEW IN THE CCR FOR S-2 AND MAJ ZETTIS.
1100: MONDAY PM ATO BREAKOUT LIFE VUL IN THE MPC FOR S-2.
1230: MONDAY PM INITIAL COORD LIFE IN THE MPC FOR CAPT RHEINHART.
1630: MONDAY PM INITIAL SLIDE REVIEW IN THE CCR FOR S-2 AND CAPT KIRCHNER.
1800: EIELSON SOCIAL / CRUD AT THE AURORA EVENTS CENTER FOR ALL OFFICERS.
1915: MONDAY PM FINAL SLIDE REVIEW IN THE CCR FOR S-2 AND CAPT FRAZER.
2100: EIELSON WELCOME PARTY AT THE YUKON CLUB FOR ALL ENLISTED.

ORDNANCE

- A. LPQD
- B. DOUBLE BUBBLE
- C. CATM-8X
- D. TCTS POD
- E. CATM-120D

ENCLOSURE (24)

OPERATIONS OFFICER

W. L. WORKMAN
COMMANDING OFFICER

MAINTENANCE OFFICER

~~2016~~

[illegible]

CODES: A—Automatic	F—ADF	L—LF range	T—TACAN
C—CCA	G—GCA	O—OMNI	S—Simulated
	I—ILS	R—Radar	J—Jet

INSTRUMENT TIME		NIGHT TIME	LANDINGS					CATALYST	STD INST APPR. COMPLETED			REMARKS
ACT	SIM		CARRIER			FCU	SEA/LAND		HD	TYPE	S	
			ARR	INC	ROL							
	0.5						6-1		1	3		2100
							6-1					2102
							6-1					3800, 4600
							6-1					3102, 3104, 3800, 4600
							6-1					3102, 3104, 4600, 3800
0.8							6-1		1	2		3102, 3104, 3800, 4600
												2102
0.8	0.5						6					
0	0	0					1					
0.8	0.5						6					

TOTALS, THIS FISCAL YEAR

Approved

CO or Authorized deputy

Prior time report submitted through last (or _____) day of this month, noted by _____

SAFEGUARD IAW PRIVACY ACT

NAVAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT RECORD

GB70WL9

AIRCRAFT DATA (RECORD TYPE 7B)

SIDE	EXC	SUNO	TEC	ORG	MSN1	HRS1	MSN2	HRS2	MSN3	HRS3	SUPT	TTLFLY	5	CAT	AIRLIFT	REC	ENG1	ENG2	ENG3	ENG4	HOIST
12		165193	AMAF	GB7	TA1	1.6					FP	1	1	0			1.6	1.6			
TOTAL MISSION REQUIREMENT (TMR) DATA																	ENGINE HRS				

AIRCREW DATA (RECORD TYPE 7C; IF EXC CODE = G, L, OR R; RECORD TYPE = 7D)

AIRCREW DATA (RECORD TYPE 7C; IF EXC CODE = S, L, CNR, RECORD TYPE 1C)																										
LINE	EXC CODE	FIRST INIT	NAME	SSN/DO ID	SPL QUAL	0	FLIGHT TIME			INSTRUMENT		NIGHT TIME	LANDINGS					APPROACHES					TRAINING CODES			
							FPT	CPT	SCT	ACT	SIM		T	N	T	N	T	N	T	N	T	N	1ST	2ND	3RD	
1					A	3	1.6				0.5		6	1										2102		

LOGISTICS DATA (DEPART - RECORD TYPE 7E; ARRIVE - RECORD TYPE 7F)

LOGISTICS DATA (DEPART - RECORD TYPE 7E, ARRIVE - RECORD TYPE 7F)																								
										DELAY					CONFIRMED PAYLOAD					OPPORTUNE PAYLOAD			CONFIG DATA	
										1ST		2ND		PRI 1	PRI 2	PRI 3	PRI 4	PRI 5						
LINE	EXC CODE	TIME ZONE	TIME	DATE (JULIAN)	ICAO OR SHIP ID	S S	DISTANCE	C O	D C	HRS	M O	HRS	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	CARGO (LBS)	PAX NO.	CARGO (LBS)	CODE 1	2	MAX PAX	MAX CARGO (LBS)
1		Y	0905	15281	PAEI													0					1	1
			1038	16281	PAEI	F																		

WEAPONS PROFICIENCY DATA (RECORD TYPE 7G)

				TRAINING AREA DATA				DELIVERY DATA 1				DELIVERY DATA 2				DELIVERY DATA 3				MISC DATA 1		MISC DATA 2	
LINE	EXC CODE	LINE NO.		TRAINING AREA 1	HRS 1	TRAINING AREA 2	HRS 2	ORD 1	DEL 1	RMS 1	SCORE 1	ORD 2	DEL 2	RMS 2	SCORE 2	ORD 3	DEL 3	RMS 3	SCORE 3	CD 1	DATA 1	CD 2	DATA 2
1		1																					

(REMARKS)	NAME GRADE LOCAL USE								HATOPS	MEDICAL	INSTRUMENT	WATER	PHYSIOLOGY	AC OR MSN CHOR SIGNATURE GRADE	
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E		

SAFEGUARD IAW PRIVACY ACT

ENCLOSURE (26)

SAFEGUARD IAW PRIVACY ACT

NAVAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT RECORD

GB70WLC

AIRCRAFT DATA (RECORD TYPE 7B)

SIDE	EXC	BUNO	TEC	ORG	MSN1	HRS1	MSN2	HRS2	MSN3	HRS3	SUPT	TTLFLT	0	CAT	AIRLIFT	REC	ENG1	ENG2	ENG3	ENG4	HOIST
12		165193	AMAF	GB7	1A1	1.2					FP	1	1	0			1.2	1.2			
TOTAL MISSION REQUIREMENT (TMR) DATA																	ENGINE HRS				

AIRCREW DATA (RECORD TYPE 7C; IF EXC CODE = G, L, OR R: RECORD TYPE = 7D)

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LOGISTICS DATA (DEPART - RECORD TYPE 7E; ARRIVE - RECORD TYPE 7F)

LOGISTICS DATA (DEPART - RECORD TYPE 1E, ARRIVE - RECORD TYPE 1F)																										
										DELAY					CONFIRMED PAYLOAD						OPPORTUNE PAYLOAD			CONFIG DATA		
										1ST		2ND		PRI 1	PRI 2	PRI 3	PRI 4	PRI 5								
LINE	EXC CODE	TIME ZONE	TIME	DATE (JULIAN)	ROAD OR SHIP I.D.	S	DISTANCE	C O D E	HRS	C O D E	HRS	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	PAX NO.	CARGO (LBS)	PAX NO.	CARGO (LBS)	C O D E	T 2	MAX PAX	MAX CARGO (LBS)			
1		T	1600	16281	PAEI												0					1	1			
			1914	16281	PAEI	F																				



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS/
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS
701 S COURTHOUSE ROAD
ARLINGTON, VA 22204

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5000
IGA
4 Nov 16

From: Inspector General of the Marine Corps
To: Commanding General, 3D Marine Aircraft Wing,
P.O. Box 452038, San Diego, CA 92145-2038
(Attn: Command Inspector General)

Subj: IG ACTION: IGMC CASE #16847

Ref: (a) MCO 5430.1
(b) Marine Corps Inspector General Program Investigations
Guide, August 2009
(c) Inspector General of the Marine Corps Policy memo 01-15

Encl: (1) Hotline Complaint #16847

1. In accordance with the references, the enclosure is forwarded as a matter under your cognizance. At a minimum, the following questions must be answered:

a. Does LtCol Workman berate his pilots in front of subordinate Marines?

b. If so, does that climate have an impact on pilot performance?

c. Does alleged climate cause pilots to fail to adhere to prescribed safety procedures, both prior to flight and in flight?

d. Does LtCol Workman berate maintainers in the course of their duties?

e. If so, does this cause maintainers to skip prescribed steps or modify performance of safety regulations?

f. Does LtCol Workman make un-executable flight schedules and subsequent last minute changes requiring support personnel to cut corners in order to meet the CO's demands?

g. Is LtCol Workman opining in the ready room about the cause of Class A Mishaps prior to the release of any mishap investigations?

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ENCLOSURE (28)

Subj: IG ACTION: IGMC CASE #16847

h. Has LtCol Workman voiced his opinion on the cause of [REDACTED] Class A Mishap to [REDACTED] prior to the completion of a mishap investigation?

i. Has a Command Climate Survey been conducted in VMFA-232 in the past 12 months?

2. Within 60 days of this letter, provide IGMC with the completed Hotline Completion Report. If a Command Investigation is conducted, upon completion, forward the HCR, Legal Sufficiency Review (LSR) and command endorsement expressing concurrence or non-concurrence with the investigating officer's determination with the investigation to IGMC.

3. If the matter is referred to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) or the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), advise IGMC of the NCIS/CID case control number and continue to monitor until closure. Upon closure, obtain a copy of the investigation and forward to IGMC.

4. At the conclusion of any administrative, judicial, nonjudicial, or other corrective action(s), provide any final disposition(s) by separate correspondence. Do not delay the submission of the investigation pending completion of command action.

5. The point of contact at Headquarters Marine Corps for inquiries related to this matter is [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE (28)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION MIRAMAR
PO BOX 452038
SAN DIEGO, CA 92145-2038

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5041
CIG
29 Nov 16

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (CIG)
To: [REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE
CORPS HOTLINE COMPLAINT CASE #16847

Ref: (a) MCO 5430.1
(b) JAGINST 5800.7F, Chapter II
(c) Inspector General of the Marine Corps Investigations Guide,
August 2009

1. You are appointed, per the references, to conduct a command investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the following allegations. Although a preliminary inquiry has been conducted that has substantiated the following allegations, your investigation will thoroughly answer the following:

a. Does LtCol Workman berate his pilots in front of subordinate Marines? If so, does this create a climate that will present a negative impact on pilot's performance?

b. Does LtCol Workman berate maintainers in the course of their duties? If so, does this cause maintainers to skip prescribed steps or modify performance of safety regulations? Do critical maintenance and quality procedures remain overlooked or not completed presenting a safety hazard?

c. Is LtCol Workman opining in the ready room about the cause of Class A Mishaps prior to the release of any mishap investigations?

d. Has LtCol Workman voiced his opinion on the cause of [REDACTED] Class A Mishap to [REDACTED] prior to the completion of a mishap investigation?

e. Since the Command Climate Survey have been conducted in VMFA-232 in the past 12 months, are there any trends or command climate issues that need to be addressed?

2. Specifically, have pilots, namely LtCol Workman flown aircraft that did not meet the safe for flight criteria:

a. Has LtCol Workman or any other pilot, taken out a jet with or didn't tell his flight that he had an unreliable airspeed indicator?

b. Has LtCol Workman or any other pilot, flown a jet with too few working form lights per F/A-18 Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix?

ENCLOSURE (29)

c. Has LtCol Workman or any other pilot, continued to fly a jet with an OBOGS degraded light?

3. Investigate the details surrounding these allegations. Interview and report on any witnesses that may have seen the alleged actions take place. Report your findings of facts, opinions, and recommendations in letter form by 16 Dec 2016, unless an extension of time is requested and granted. If you have not previously done so, read the references in their entirety before beginning your investigation. If on the course of your investigation you require subject matter experts from DOSS, ALD or the Naval Safety Center, contact the IG for guidance. Furthermore, if you uncover issues that present abuse of authority, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty, consult the IG and Chief of Staff.

4. You may seek legal advice from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Office of the Staff Judge Advocate during the course of your investigation.

5. The point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], 3d MAW Inspector General Chief, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

Copy to:
Files

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: WADE WORKMAN Rank/Rate: LTCOL
Activity: VMFA-232 Unit: VMFA-232 / HQ
Telephone Number: [REDACTED]

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: _____ and that: _____

[REDACTED] I have the right to remain silent
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with legal counsel prior to any questioning. This legal counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expenses, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[REDACTED] I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

[REDACTED] I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

[REDACTED]
(Witness Signature & Date)

[REDACTED] 20th 12.07
(Member Signature & Date)

****Continued on next page (If statement provided)****

ENCLOSURE (30)

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: MAJOR
Activity: AMO Unit: UMFA-232
Telephone Number: [REDACTED]

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: NONE and that:

[REDACTED] I have the right to remain silent
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with legal counsel prior to any questioning. This legal counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expenses, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[REDACTED] I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

[REDACTED] I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

[REDACTED]
(Witness Signature & Date)

[REDACTED] 20161219
(Member Signature & Date)

****Continued on next page (If statement provided)****

ENCLOSURE (31)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCE PACIFIC
BOX 367051
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92135-7051

4790
Ser N422C/055
31 MAY 16

From: Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (PMA-265)

Subj: FA-18A/B/C/D MISSION ESSENTIAL SUBSYSTEM MATRIX (MESM)

Ref: (a) COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B
(b) COMNAVAIRLANT FA-18 Class Desk, Code N421F, email of 31 May 2016

Encl: (1) FA-18 A.B/C/D MESM, 31 May 2016

1. Per reference (a), reference (b) change recommendation to the FA-18A.B/C/D MESM is approved.
Enclosure (1) is in effect immediately.

2. COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVAIRLANT POC: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
By direction

Copy to:
CNAF Sharepoint Web Site

ENCLOSURE (32)

F/A-18A/B/C/D
TYPE EQUIPMENT CODES: AMAA/AMAE/AMAF/AMAG

Do not assign an EOC code if all equipment is operational. The aircraft is FMC.

Assign EOC code (C) when the following system is inoperative preventing the ATARS tactical reconnaissance mission. The aircraft is not capable of collecting electro-optical, IR, or SAR imagery. The aircraft is PMC.

ATARS (AN/ASD-10(V)) WIRING AND HARDWARE (Note 23)

Assign EOC code (D) when the following system is inoperative preventing the HARM mission. The aircraft is not capable of launching high speed anti-radiation missiles. The aircraft is PMC.

ACM (AWG-25) HARM

Assign EOC code (E) when the following system is inoperative preventing a type of missile launch. The aircraft is not capable of launching a Sparrow air to air missile. The aircraft is PMC.

MISSILE ILLUMINATION GROUP SPARROW

Assign EOC code (I) when the following systems are inoperative preventing the aircraft from air to air refueling. The aircraft is not capable of receiving fuel airborne. The aircraft is PMC.

AIR REFUELING PROBE (Note 2)
AIR REFUELING PROBE FLOOD LIGHT (Note 2)

Assign EOC code (J) when the following systems are inoperative preventing the basic strike fighter mission. The aircraft is not capable of conducting interdiction, mining, reconnaissance, air to ground attack, close air support, forward air control, combat air protection, offensive/defensive counter air, deck launched intercept, air combat maneuvering, or war-at-sea missions using all weapons and delivery modes regardless of terrain, weather or enemy defenses. The aircraft is PMC.

ATFLIR/DATA LINK (ROVER) LITENING POD WIRING/PLUMBING (Note 25)
CENTERLINE PYLON
CHAFF COUNTERMEASURES SET (ALE-39/47)
COCKPIT VIDEO RECORDING SYSTEM (CVRS) / SOLID STATE
RECORDER (SSR) (Note 1)
COUNTERMEASURES SET (ALQ-126/165/214)

F/A-18A/B/C/D
TYPE EQUIPMENT CODES: AMAA/AMAE/AMAF/AMAG

DDIs	(Note 13)
DIGITAL MAP / TAMMAC	
GPS (MAGR-EGI, R-2512A/U)	(Note 23)
HAVEQUICK / SINGCGARS (ARC-210/DCS)	(Note 1)
HELMET MOUNTED CUEING SYSTEM	(Note 1, 23)
IFF INTERROGATIONS (APX-111)	(Note 1, 20, 23)
MISSION COMPUTER 2	
MPCD/HSI	
NIGHT VISION LIGHTING	
PALLETIZED GUN SYSTEM (M61A1)	(Note 22)
RADAR LIQUID COOLING SYSTEM	
RADAR SET (APG-65/73)	(Note 26)
RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (ALR-67)	
SECURED IFF (KIV-6 / KIT-IC) (MODE 4)	(Note 1)
SECURE VOICE (KY-58)	(Note 1)
SELECTIVE STORES JETTISON SYSTEM	(Note 12)
STORES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM	
THREAT WARNING LIGHT DISPLAY GROUP	
WEAPON RELEASE RACKS (BRU-32/A, A/A)	(Note 23)
WEAPON SYSTEM CONTROL FUNCTION (ROTAS)	(Note 4)
WING PYLONS (SUU-63)	(Note 23)

Assign EOC code (K) when the following systems are inoperative preventing shipboard flight operations. The aircraft is not capable of safe movement on and off CV during day, night and inclement weather conditions, conducting independent navigation. The aircraft is PMC.

APPROACH POWER COMPENSATOR SYSTEM	
AOA INDEXER LIGHTS	(Note 21)
ILS RECEIVER/DECODER (ARA-63)	
LAUNCH BAR AND CATAPULT SYSTEM	(Note 5)
RADAR BEACON (RT-1028/APN-202) AND AUGMENTATION	
RECEIVER R-1623/APN	(Note 5)
RECEIVER TRANSMITTER PROCESSOR (RT-1379/ASW)	(Note 5)
WING FOLD	

F/A-18A/B/C/D
TYPE EQUIPMENT CODES: AMAA/AMAE/AMAF/AMAG

Assign EOC code (L) when the following systems are inoperative preventing the IMC flight mission. The aircraft is not capable of day or night IMC field flight operations when necessary communication, IFF, navigation, flight and safety systems required by applicable OPNAV, NATOPS and FAA. The aircraft is PMC.

ALTIMETER, ELECTRONIC (APN-194) (RADALT)
ENGINE ANTI ICE SYSTEM (Note 19)
EXTERIOR POSITION LIGHTS (POSITION AND FORMATION) (Note 6)
INTERFERENCE BLANKER (IBU/EIBU) MX-9965/A, MX1106/A,
MX-1174/A
IFF TRANSPONDER (APX-100/111, RT-1832) (Note 18)
INTERIOR LIGHTING
MAGNETIC COMPASS (AQU-3/A)
PITOT/ANGLE OF ATTACK PROBE HEATER SYSTEM (Note 19)
TACTICAL NAVIGATION SET/ARN-118/MIDS LVT (AN/USQ-140 (V)(C)) (Note 17)
TAXI LIGHT
UP FRONT CONTROL
UHF/VHF COMM SYSTEM WITH 8.33 KHZ SPACING (2 REQUIRED) (Note 3)
WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICE AND RAIN REMOVAL

Assign EOC code (Z) when the following systems/conditions prevent the aircraft from being safely flyable. The aircraft is not capable of day VMC field flight operations with two-way radio communication and necessary aircraft and crew safety provisions. The aircraft is NMC.

AIR CONDITIONING/PRESSURIZATION AIRFRAME
ANGLE OF ATTACK SYSTEM
ANTI-G SUIT PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM APO
BOARDING LADDER ASSEMBLY (Note 24)
CFIRS/DFIRS
CONDITIONAL INSPECTION (Note 11)
CSC
DATA STORAGE UNIT (DSU) MAGTAPE/TAMMAC/MDL/ (Note 14)
EJECTION SEATS/ESCAPE SYSTEM
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
EMERGENCY JETTISON SYSTEM (Note 15)
EMERGENCY/PARKING BRAKE
EMI PROTECTION DEVICES (Note 7)
ENGINE INSPECTION (Note 11)
ENGINES
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

F/A-18A/B/C/D
TYPE EQUIPMENT CODES: AMAA/AMAE/AMAF/AMAG

FIRE DETECTION/EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM / BLEED AIR DETECTION SYSTEM
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
FLIGHT INCIDENT RECORDING AND MONITORING SYSTEM (FIRAMS)
FLIGHT REFERENCE SYSTEMS (Note 8)
FUEL SYSTEM (FUSELAGE AND WINGS)
HUD
HYDRAULIC / PNEUMATIC SYSTEMS
INSTRUMENT / INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS (Note 9)
INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (F/A-18B/D)
INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM (INS)
LIGHTING SYSTEMS (ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT) (2 MINIMUM)
LANDING GEAR
MISSION COMPUTER 1
OBOGS / LOX
PHASE INSPECTION (Note 11)
SIDEWINDER LAUNCHERS (SERIES) (STATION 1 AND 9) (Note 16)
SPECIAL INSPECTION (Note 11)
STORES MANAGEMENT PROCESSOR/STORES MANAGEMENT UPGRADE (SMUG)
STRAIN GAUGES (Note 10)
TAILHOOK ARRESTMENT SYSTEM
TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE COMPLIANCE (Note 11)
UHF/VHF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS (COMM 1 REQUIRED)
WEIGHT AND BALANCE
WHEEL ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEM

NOTES:

1. Does not apply to adversary mission.
2. Z-coded if aircraft assigned to a unit engaged in and while conducting CV cyclic operations.
3. Two 8.33 kHz spacing radios(RT-1556A, RT-1556 8, RT-1824) are required for flight in European airspace if normal flight operation handling desired. Flight operation without two 8.33 KHZ spacing radios is at the discretion/convenience of ATC.
4. All air-to-air, ACM, and air-to-ground modes required.
5. Either: RADAR Beacon (RT-1028/APN-202) and Augmentation Receiver (R-1623/APN), and Receiver Transmitter(R- 1379/A SW), or ILS Receiver (R-1379/ARA-63) and Decoder (KY-651/A RA-63) required.
6. (L) Coded if less than two (2) position lights and three (3) formation lights are operable on each side of aircraft.
7. Due to relationship of electromagnetic interference (EMI) to safety of flight, maintenance of all EMI protection devices shall be maintained within limits specified in the appropriate technical manuals.
8. Includes: Air Data Computer Equipment, Magnetic Azimuth Detector.
9. Includes: Pressure Altimeter (Both Standby and Reset Modes), Airspeed Indicator, Vertical Speed Indicator, Standby Gyro.
10. Either the primary or backup strain gauge, located in the five strain gauge locations (Wing Root, Wing Fold, Forward Fuselage, Right Horizontal Tail, Left Horizontal Tail) must be operable.

F/A-18A/B/C/D
TYPE EQUIPMENT CODES: AMAA/AMAE/AMAF/AMAG

(NOTE: RIGHT AND LEFT VERTICAL TAIL STRAIN GAUGES NO LONGER USED. MMP CODES 604 AND 605 ARE NOT APPLICABLE.)

11. As applicable per COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2.
12. Required based on mission loadout and stores loading and required for shipboard operations based on loadout/stores loading and Blue Water operations.
13. Minimum of 1 required for flight.
14. Maintenance card required.
15. Not Z coded if no stores on aircraft. J coded if no jettisonable stores on aircraft.
16. Both must be installed for flight. When installed but inoperative system may be J coded.
17. TACAN or MIDs box must be installed.
18. Mode C required for FAA.
19. Required for flight in potential icing conditions.
20. Beam forming network (BFN) and blade antenna (AS- 4440/APX-111 (V)) required for APX-111 interrogation function.
21. Required for FCLPs.
22. J coded if inop, Z coded when not installed.
23. If configured.
24. Not Z coded if Ladder capable of being up and locked without associated cautions and FOD hazard.
25. ATFLIR pod must power on to prevent damage to ATFLIR system.
26. Radar must power on so the Antenna is in a locked position otherwise it is Z coded. Do not use boresight pins to lock Antenna Array.